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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
THE CANADIAN ARCTIC WATERS POLLUTION
PREVENTION ACT: AN ANALYSIS
With the discovery of substantial petroleum reserves on
Alaska's north slope, the oil and gas industry was faced with
the problem of transporting raw products from the drilling site
to refineries and areas of use. In response to this need, Humble
Oil Company converted a large, conventional tanker, the
Manhattan, into a super ice-breaker to determine the feasibility
of an ocean transport route between the Alaskan oil fields and
the eastern coast of America utilizing the fabled and often ice-
bound Northwest Passage. The Manhattan made two voyages,'
but only with the help of American and Canadian ice-breakers,
and even then she sustained significant hull damage, rendering
problematical the practical use of this method of transport.
Although the industry and the United States government appear
to have reached agreement on the construction of an Alaskan
pipeline, Humble, while acknowledging that the pipeline
presently seems to be the more desirable of the two methods for
transporting north slope oil, nevertheless has continued publicly
to deny that the Manhattan project has been shelved.2 Regardless
of whether the Manhattan's voyages presaged a new era in ocean
transportation, they did precipitate a new conflict in the law
of the sea. Canada responded by promulgating the Arctic Waters
Pollution Prevention Act (AWPPA hereinafter),8 unilaterally
asserting its right as a coastal state to protect the shores of its
mainland and its claimed Arctic territories from the potentially
destructive effects of marine pollution. Not surprisingly, the
United States Government protested the Canadian action, con-
demning it, among other things, as a dangerous precedent for
unilateralism which might be cited by other nations as justi-
fication for their own less meritorious claims over maritime
areas.
4
1. For a personal account of the Manhattan's initial voyage, see Keating,
North for Oil: Manhattan Makes the Historic Northwest Passage, 137 NA-
TIONAL GEOGRAPHIC (No. 3) 374 (1970). See also Keith, Across the Top, UNITED
STATES NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS (No. 8) 60, 69 (1970). The Manhattan's
first voyage took place in the fall of 1969, the second in the spring of 1970.
2. N.Y. Times, Aug. 16, 1970, at 78, col. 1. The voyage of the Manhattan
reawakened Interest in petrochemical and mining activities on Baffin Island.
N.Y. Times, Dec. 26, 1970, at 27, col. 6.
3. 18 & 19 Eliz. 2, c. 47 (Can. 1970), reproduced in 9 INT'L LEGAL MATE-
RIALS 543 (1970) and 69 MICH. L. REV. 38 (1970).
4. See U.S. Opposes Unilateral Extension by Canada of High Seas Juris-
diction, 62 DEP'T STATE BULL. 610, 611 (1970) reproduced in 9 INT'L LEGAL MATE-
RIALS 605 (1970).
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Canada's jurisdictional claim, while posed in the timely
rhetoric of pollution control, is but one of a number of exten-
sive contemporary claims over maritime areas by coastal states.6
The purpose of this Comment is to analyze the Canadian Arctic
claim and, drawing from this analysis, to postulate standards
by which such unilateral extensions of jurisdiction over mari-
time areas may be judged in the future. Because Canada cast the
AWPPA in terms of limited jurisdiction-i.e., a "special con-
tiguous zone"--the subject of territorial expansion through uni-
lateral extension of a state's territorial or inland waters will
not be the concern of this Comment. It would seem, however,
that standards for judging zones of limited jurisdiction would
apply a fortiori to more extensive assertions.
Since the AWPPA should be viewed not only as an example
of modern unilateral extensions of maritime jurisdiction but also
in historical context as one of many Canadian claims affecting
the Arctic, it is necessary that the development of Canadian
and other national interests in the Arctic be discussed.
Jurisdictional Claims and Perceived Interests in the Arctic
United States' policy on the Arctic has been consistent
since the explorations of Peary in asserting that the area is
incapable of appropriation by any state.6 In contrast, Canada
has made consistent territorial claims to Arctic land areas and
on several occasions has extended these claims to the ice and
waters of the region as well.
The foundation for the Canadian claims is derived from
"British discoveries, claims, occupation, and piecemeal trans-
fers." Not content to rest its argument on its position as
successor to the British, Canada has sought to bolster its claims
5. The most notable and extensive of these claims is that of the "CEP"
(Chile, Ecuador, and Peru) to a 200-mile territorial sea. Less dramatic, but of
equal importance, are exclusive fishing zone claims to twelve miles and
beyond; customs law enforcement outside twelve miles; the United States'
Air Defense Identification Zones (ADIZ); neutrality proclamations covering
extensive sea areas; and safety zones for nuclear testing.
6. Pharand, Freedom of the Seas in the Arctic Ocean, 19 U. TORONTO L.J.
210, 227 (1969). The author points out that the United States has conducted
extensive submarine exploratory activities in the Arctic with the voyages of
the USS Nautilus (1957, 1958), USS Skate (1958, 1960), USS Sargo (1960), and
USS Seadragon (1960), reaffirming the United States' position that the Arctic
Ocean is subject to the regime of the high seas.
7. Cohen, The Arctic and the National Interest, 26 INV'L J. 52, 55 (1970-71).
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by citing as acts of "effective occupation"8 its exploration
expeditions and, particularly, the farflung Arctic administrative
activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.9 On occasion,
Canada has alluded to an archipelago argument'0 and has also
asserted continental shelf claims.". Thus, Canadian assertions of
sovereignty over Arctic land masses have been put on as wide
a basis as possible, and many have concluded that Canada's
interest in the area claimed by it, while perhaps not amounting
to sovereignty, gives it at least an interest superior to any
potential challenger's.12
In addition, the "sector theory" has been allotted a part
in Canadian Arctic claims. 18 Regardless, however, of the efficacy
8. The Clipperton Island arbitration award [see 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 390
(1932)] has been interpreted as authority for the theory that activities of
occupation in less habitable regions such as the Arctic need not be as exten-
sive as in the normal case:
"[W]hat are the requisites of 'use and settlement' in a particular
case, and especially in a case involving those parts of the earth which
are Incapable of the traditional kind of occupation? What of uninhabited
and uninhabitable islands, of the arctic and antarctic regions ... ?
[T]he occupation which is required is such an occupation as is appropri-
ate and possible under the circumstances. It is a question of fact."
Dickenson, The Clipperton Island Case, 27 AM. J. INT'L L. 130, 132-33 (1933).
9. See Cohen, supra note 7, at 55; Head, Canadian Claims to Territorial
Sovereignty in the Arctic Regions, 9 McGILL L.J. 200, 213 (1963); Myers, Politi-
cal Rights in the Canadian Arctic, 4 INT'L LAW. 666, 669 (1970); Note, 11 LES
CAHIERS Dz DROIT 66 (1970).
10. See Cohen, supra note 7, at 61, 80.
11. See Cohen, supra note 7, at 61-62.
12. See, e.g., Head, supra note 9, at 225.
13. The "sector theory" derives from a notion of contiguity and is an
assertion of jurisdiction over the area included in the wedge-shaped region
bounded by lines from Canada's east and west coasts projected to the North
Pole. Lester Pearson, then Canadian Ambassador to the United States,
stated:
"A large part of the world's total Arctic area is Canadian. One should
know exactly what this part comprises. It includes not only Canada's north-
ern mainland, but the islands and the frozen sea north of the mainland
between the meridians of its east and west boundaries, extended to the North
Pole." Pearson, Canada Looks "Down North," 24 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 638 (1946).
Controversy has raged over the sector theory since its inception in the
early part of this century. It is still unclear whether it has ever been officially
urged by a Canadian government and whether, if urged, it is merely a claim
to land or if the sector includes the ice and water as well. Compare Cohen,
supra note 7, intimating the sector theory applies only to islands, with Head,
supra note 9, at 203, 223-24, and 1 C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 349 (2d ed. 1945).
For an opinion that the sector theory is being urged by the present govern-
ment, see Meredith, A Plan For the Arctic, 60 THE ROUND TABLE (No. 238) 177,
179, 182 (1970). It is generally agreed that the sector theory has little merit
as a basis for territorial claims. See Head, supra note 9, at 205, wherein the
author points out that the theory is based solely on contiguity and is
practically meritless in comparison to claims of "effective occupation." Never-
theless, the sector theory is a helpful concept insofar as it provides a
geographical frame of reference for assertions of jurisdiction based on other
more reasonable Justifications.
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of the sector theory for claiming Arctic ice, Canada has always
been quick to assert that the notions of freedom of the seas
are largely inappropriate to the Arctic due to the permanent
presence of the ice: 14
"It is idle . . . to talk of freedom of the high seas
with respect to an area, large parts of which are covered
with ice throughout the year, other parts of which are
covered with ice most of each year, and where the local
inhabitants use the frozen sea as an extension of the land
to travel over it by dogsled and snowmobile far more than
they can use it as water."'5
Many authorities have argued that the doctrine of freedom of
the seas is applicable to the Arctic to the extent of actual
navigability'0 and the ability to exercise other classical freedoms
of the high seas.' 7 Navigation, both surface and submarine, is
now being carried on in Arctic waters, 8 and no restrictions on
overflight have been asserted.19 While various attempts have
been made to categorize the ice as a substance more closely
resembling terra firma than liquid sea,20 it would appear that
very few ice masses are of sufficient size and permanence to
justify categorization as "territory."2'
14. Johnston, The Arctic Marine Environment: A Managerial Perspective,
THE LAW OF THE SEA: THE UNITED NATIONS AND OCEAN MANAGEMENT-PROCEED-
INGS OF THE FIFTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE LAW OF THE SEA INSTITUTE 312,
315 (L. Alexander ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as THE UNITED NATIONS AND
OCEAN MANAGEMENT]; Koers, The Canadian Arctic and the Northwest Passage,
OCEAN SCIENCE NEWS: THE NAUTILUS PAPERS (No. 1) at 8 (1970); Pharand,
supra note 6, at 210-11, 229-30; Note, 3 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 189, 192-95 (1970).
15. Canadian Reply to the U.S. Government, 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 607,
611 (1970).
16. Koers, supra note 14, at 4.
17. Pharand, supra note 6, at 232.
18. See note 6 supra.
19. See Pharand, supra note 6, at 232.
20. The ice has been variously characterized as: "immobile ice, territoire
glaciaire, permanent Ice, glaces dterneles, polar ice cap, quasi-land, quasi-
fixed mass .... ." Pharand, supra note 6, at 211.
21. See Pharand, The Legal Status of Ice Shelves and Ice Islands in the
Arctic, 10 LES CAHIERS DE DROIT 461 (1969), wherein the author points out that
"ice floes," large pieces of sea ice constituting the Arctic ice pack, lack the
required permanence and stability to be occupied for any substantial length
of time. The same is true for the larger "ice-islands;" however, "ice-shelves,"
from which the "ice-islands" are generated may be considered capable of
occupation as "territory." For example, Ward Hunt Ice Shelf was, until
1962, forty-five miles long and extended ten miles seaward beyond the coast-
line of Ellesmere Island. However, only four major ice shelves are known to
have existed recently in the Canadian-claimed portion of the Arctic and all
were located along the coast of Ellesmere Island. Of these, two had com-
pletely broken up by 1967, and in 1969, only two (Ward Hunt and Milne)
remained. By contrast, ice shelves are very common in the Antarctic.
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Canadian claims to Arctic seas, when compared to the
complexity and ambivalence of land and ice claims, have been
relatively simple and straightforward. Until recently, Canada
claimed a three-mile territorial sea,22 although some areas,
notably Hudson Bay, were denominated as "historic waters."2 3
Some have urged that Canada announce an archipelago claim,
the effect of which would be to classify waters within straight
baselines joining the outer islands of the Arctic archipelago as
internal waters and thus fully subject to Canadian sovereignty. 24
As yet no such claim has been forthcoming from the Canadian
Government. However, the territorial sea has recently been
expanded to a breadth of twelve miles25 and new exclusive
fisheries zones, measured from straight baselines, have been
announced.26
Whatever the persuasiveness of earlier Canadian Arctic
claims, her recent anxiety over the fragile ecology of the far
north seems quite justified. There is no presently known tech-
nique for controlling or dispelling a large Arctic oil spill, since
it would seep beneath the ice and congeal. Further, the rate
of hydrocarbon breakdown in the Arctic is many times slower
than in more temperate climes. Thus, the effects of a large
Arctic oil spill might well be catastrophic: temperature varia-
tions could occur with unknown long-range results since the
weather conditions of the Arctic exert a great influence upon
those of the entire northern hemisphere; oxygenation processes
could be disrupted and retarded; breathing holes could be
blocked, destroying the primary food supply for Eskimos and
22. See note 25 infra.
23. Cohen, supra note 7, at 25.
24. I-ead, supra note 9, at 218-20. Although the decision of the Inter-
national Court of Justice in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case [1951],
I.C.J. 116, and article 4 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone, done April 29, 1958, [1964] 2 U.S.T. 1606; T.I.A.S. No. 5639;
516 U.N.T.S. 205 (effective 10 September 1964) might permit the delimitation
of such baselines, article 5(2) of the Convention provides: "Where the estab-
lishment of a straight baseline in accordance with article 4 has the effect of
enclosing as internal waters areas which previously had been considered as
part of the territorial sea or of the high seas, a right of innocent passage ...
shall exist in those waters." While Canada is not a party to the treaty, it
could be argued that article 5(2) is indicative of customary international law
and therefore binding irrespective of the treaty; however, a similar plea by
the British in the Fheries case, supra, was unsuccessful.
25. An Act To Amend the Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act, 18 & 19
Eliz. 2, c. 68 (Can. 1970); reproduced in 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 553 (1970).
26. 18 & 19 Eliz. 2, c. 68, § 4 (Can. 1970).
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carnivorous wildlife; and, finally, the only known nesting area
of many bird species could be fouled and destroyed.27
Faced on the one hand with the knowledge that Arctic
pollution could result in unprecedented environmental havoc,
Canada was, on the other hand, made aware of accelerating
economic interest in the Arctic. Soon after the first Manhattan
voyage, it was authoritatively predicted that large ore carriers
would be plying their trade between Arctic islands by 1976
and that container traffic between Europe and the Far East
would be initiated within a few years thereafter.28 New ice-
breaking techniques are being pioneered29 while the Japanese
and Russians, the latter employing nuclear power systems, are
enjoying considerable success with newly built ice-breaking
vessels.80 While there is little potential for Arctic fisheries be-
cause of the ecological peculiarities of the region,3 1 the outlook
for gas and oil exploitation is excellent.82
Confronted with the prospect of commercialization of the
Arctic, Canada has evinced dissatisfaction with present con-
ventional anti-pollution measures.8 3 The 1954 Convention on the
27. LeGault, Canadian Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Legislation,
THE UNITED NATIONS AND OCEAN MANAGEMENT, supra note 14, at 294, 295.
28. CRAVEN, ReS Nullius De Facto-The Limits of Technology, PROCEEDINGS
OF THE SYMPOSIUM ON THE INTERNATIONAL REGIME OF THE SEA-BED 520-22
(Sztucki ed. 1970); Keith, supra note 1, at 69.
29. One new technique is the development of the "Alexbow device."
Used successfully in 1968 to transport equipment to Melville Island (located
north of Victoria Island in the Canadian Northwest Territories), a similar
attempt in 1969 failed, culminating in the sinking of two barges. For a de-
scription of the device, see 14 POLAR RECORD (No. 89) 228 (1968). For an ac-
count of the device in actual use, see Recent and Future Mineral Develop-
ments in Northern Canada, 15 POLAR RECORD (No. 95) 151, 164 (1970).
30. Pharand, supra note 6, at 223-24. See also W. BUTLER, THE LAW OF
SOVIET TERRITORIAL WATERS 84 (1967).
31. "To focus the problem on the northern Canadian waters: the Arctic
Ocean itself, contained by the northern shores of Siberia, Greenland, Canada,
and Alaska, can safely be dismissed in terms of the development of fisheries
of any kind." Dunbar, On the Fishing Potential of the Sea Waters of the
Canadian North, 23 ARCTIC (No. 3) 150, 153 (1970). This is due to the Arctic
Ocean's vertical stability. High vertical instability is necessary for fish pro-
duction since by this motion the nutrient-fertilizers are brought towards the
surface and made accessible to the plankton upon which the fish feed.
32. 15 POLAR RECORD, supra note 29, at 60-64.
33. "The law of freedom of the seas has been a law of laissez-faire favor-
ing the shippers of the world. Shipping states are potential perpetrators of
serious pollution threatening coastal states as well as the 'commonage' of
the seas, but they have the votes at conferences and the principle of unanim-
ity to resist comprehensive regulation. Recent flurries of activity have pro-
duced neither cure nor effective control, and Canada, in particular, has been
outvoted at several anti-pollution conferences." (Citations omitted.) Henkin,
Arctic AntWPollution: Does Canada Make-or Break-International Law, 65
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Prevention of the Pollution of the Sea by OiJ14 is in force for
both Canada and the United States, but the United States made
significant reservations to the Convention, rendering it of ques-
tionable value for littoral states fearful of marine pollution.85
The 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas88 condemned
pollution by radioactive waste 1 and oil discharge,8s but pro-
vided no enforcement procedures. Two further treaties, the 1969
International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution
Damage (known as the "Private Law" treaty) m and the Inter-
national Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas
in Case of Oil Pollution Casualties (known as the "Public Law"
treaty) 4 followed in the wake of the Torrey Canyon disaster.41
However, even these pacts are beset by significant shortcom-
ings-e.g., their failure to deal with pollution by instrumental-
ities other than ocean vessels, the problem of identifying
offenders, and the limiting of compensation on the basis of the
resources of the shipowner.4 It seems that the Intergovern-
AM. J. INTL. L. 131, 132 (1971). See also Johnston, supra note 14, at 314; Le-
Gault, supra note 27, at 299.
34. Done May 12, 1954, [19611 3 U.S.T. 2989; T.I.A.S. No. 4900; 327 U.N.T.S.
3 (effective 26 July 1958); amended April 11, 1962, [1966] 2 U.S.T. 1523; T.I.A.S.
No. 6109. Effective in part on 18 May 1967, and in part on 28 June 1967.
35. See [1961] 8 U.S.T. 3024; T.I.A.S. No. 4900. The United States, while
it agreed to urge port authorities and owners of private oil terminals to pro-
vide adequate disposal facilities, would not obligate itself to construct such
facilities. Also, amendments are to be effective with regard to the United
States only after the United States has notified other parties of acceptance
of the amendments.
36. Done April 29, 1958, [1962] 2 U.S.T. 2312; T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S.
82 (effective 30 September 1962).
37. Id. art. 24.
38. Id. art. 25.
39. Opened for signature Nov. 29, 1969; reproduced in 64 AM. J. INT'L L.
481 (1970).
40. Opened for signature Nov. 29, 1969; reproduced in 64 AM. J. INT'L L.
471 (1970).
41. On March 18, 1967, the Torrey Canyon, an oil tanker, ran aground off
Cornwall, England, resulting in a massive oil spill. See E. COWAN, OIL AND
WATER: THE TORREY CANYON DISASTER (1968); Nanda, The Torrey Canyon
Disaster: Some Legal Aspects, 44 DENVER L.J. 400 (1967); Some Recent
Developments in the Law of the Sea: A Synopsis, 7 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 627,
656 (1970). Cohen, supra note 7, at 78, states that it would take 25-75 years
for the molecular decomposition of oil released from a disaster of Torrey
Canyon proportions in the Arctic. E. COWAN, Supra at 200, points out that
under United States law, the Torrey Canyon's owner's liability would have
been limited to the value of the single remaining lifeboat (about $50).
42. Koers, supra note 14, at 8. The International Convention on Civil
Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, opened for signature Nov. 1969; re-
produced in 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 481 (1970), provides in art. V: "The owner
of a ship shall be entitled to limit his liability under this Convention in re-
spect of any one incident to an aggregate amount of 2,000 francs for each
ton of the ship's tonnage. However, this aggregate amount shall not in any
event exceed 210 million francs." For a general discussion on the limitations
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mental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO) would be
an ideal organization to recommend reforms, and, indeed, IMCO
was responsible for the latest treaties mentioned above. The
Canadians, however, distrust IMCO, since they feel it is con-
trolled by shipping interests,48 and are of the opinion that the
last round of IMCO-sponsored treaties made little, if any,
progress towards an acceptable solution to the problem of
marine pollution:
"Canada . . . has thoroughly tested the climate for
international action against marine pollution, most recently
at Brussels [the outcome of which was the "Public Law"
and "Private Law" treaties, discussed above] and has found
it seriously wanting. The outcome of the Brussels Confer-
ence, indeed, was so little oriented towards environmental
preservation and so much oriented towards the interests of
ship and cargo-owning States that Canada abstained from
voting on the ["Public Law" treaty] dealing with the right
of intervention on the high seas, and voted against the
["Private Law" treaty]. 1 4 4
Finally, no discussion of Canadian motivations would be
complete without a reference to the country's recent surge of
nationalism, resulting in public pressure to insulate from non-
Canadian interests what is generally regarded by Canadians as
"their" Arctic.
4
The AWPPA-and its Justifications
For purposes of anti-pollution enforcement, Canada could
have utilized, by virtue of its twelve-mile territorial sea claim,
a theory of Canadian sovereignty over key straits together with
a claim to all archipelagic waters,46 thus exercising "spot juris-
of the earlier anti-pollution treaties, see Koers, supra note 14, at 5; Schram,
The Role of the United Nations in Curbing Ocean Poluttion, PROCEEDINGS OF
THE CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL AND INTERSTATE REGULATION OF WATER POL-
LUTION [hereinafter cited as POLLUTION PROCEEDINGS] 86 (1970).
43. See, e.g., Johnston, supra note 14, at 318. See also the statements of
Hon. Claiborne Pell, Senator from Rhode Island, In preface to L. ALEXANDER,
THE LAW OF THE SEA: OFFSHORE BOUNDARIES AND ZONES (1967).
44. LeGault, supra note 27, at 299.
45. Cohen, supra note 7, at 65; Meredith, supra note 13, at 178; Ratiner,
Commentary, THE UNITED NATIONS AND OCEAN MANAGEMENT, supra note 14, at
307. For a typical expression of the new-found Canadian nationalism, see
Corbett, Life With Father, 26 INT'L J. 52 (1970-71); Newman, The Thawing
of Canada, 54 SATURDAY REVIEW (No. 11) 15 (Mar. 13, 1971).
46. Bilder, The Canadian Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act: New
Stresses on the Law of the Sea, 69 MICH. L. REV. 1, 7 (1970).
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diction." However, Canada chose instead to use the bolder
concept of a broad contiguous zone,47 extending 100 miles48 into
the Arctic Ocean:
"[T]he Act seems to be based on the theory of Canada's
right to exercise jurisdiction for pollution control purposes
on the high seas contiguous to but outside of Canadian ter-
ritorial waters, rather than on the theory that the waters
embraced in the legislation are territorial or internal waters
subject to Canadian sovereignty." 49
One rationale advanced for the Canadian choice of using a broad
contiguous zone rather than merely exercising "spot jurisdic-
tion" is that the control which could be exercised under the
latter method, while adequate for some purposes such as hull
construction requirements, is obviously inadequate for other
controls-e.g., the imposition of navigational rules for the high
seas portions of the area embraced within the zone.60
The operational aspects of the AWPPA are sweeping in
import since the exercise of many powers claimed would
impinge on what has traditionally been regarded as freedom
of the high seas. 51 The AWPPA pertains both to ships and other
47. See generally C. COLOMBOS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE) SEA 110-13
(6th ed. 1967); M. McDOUGAL and W. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS
565-724 (1962).
48. Professor Johnston, in a discussion reproduced in THE UNITED NATIONS
AND OCEAN MANAGEMENT, supra note 14, at 322, commented: "There is no magic
in the number 100, but I would think that the decision on this figure was
influenced by the progression in the IMCO deliberations [see note 44 supra],
50 miles and then 100 miles, in the context of liability for pollution at sea.
If you take an environmental approach, as we must, to problems in the Arctic,
and pay attention especially to the slow processes of growth in the Arctic
waters, it might seem that 100 miles is inadequate. Personally, I think it may
have been a mistake to limit pollution control authority in the Arctic to 100
miles."
49. Bilder, supra note 46, at 13.
50. Koers, supra note 14, at 5. Canada would probably also have to
reckon with the problem of affording the vessels of other nations the right
of innocent passage. See Pharand, Innocent Passage in the Arctic, 6 CAN.
Y.B. INT'L L. 3 (1968). Cohen, supra note 7, at 66, denies the existence of his-
toric rights of passage because only six other vessels have traversed the pas-
sage, and the Manhattan's voyage was the first "serious commercial experi-
ment." See also Comment, 62 AM. J. INT'L L. 927 (1968).
51. Convention on the High Seas, done April 29, 1958, art. 2 [1962] 2 U.S.T.
2312; T.I.A.S. No. 5200; 450 U.N.T.S. 82 (effective 30 September 1962): "Free-
dom of the high seas comprises, inter alia, both for coastal and non-coastal
states:
"(1) Freedom of navigation;
"(2) Freedom of fishing;
"(3) Freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines;
"(4) Freedom to fly over the high seas.
"These freedoms, and others which are recognized by the general prin-
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exploration and exploitation activities on the Arctic seas,52
regardless of whether the sea exists in frozen or liquid state,53
and the zone of control extends 100 miles seaward from land
subject to Canadian sovereignty.54 The deposit of "waste" 5
is prohibited-its deposit or the likelihood of its deposit must
be reported. 56 "Shipping safety control zones" may be declared,
and vessels not possessing required navigational aids or failing
to meet structural requirements may be banned from passage
through the zone.57 Worthy of special note is that passage may
be prohibited altogether at certain times of the year due to ice
conditions.55 Pollution prevention officers are empowered to
inspect and to order ships in or near a safety control zone to
remain outside of it.59 Furthermore, ships and cargo may be
seized by pollution prevention officers (with the consent of
the Governor-in-Council) if it is reasonably suspected that the
AWPPA is being violated.60 The Governor may require evidence
of financial responsibility in the form of a bond or insurance
from persons exploiting natural resources or shipowners where
an accident might result in the deposit of waste.' Finally, the
AWPPA provides for civil liability for harm occurring from the
deposit of waste, 62 and negligence need not be proved.6 3
As partial justification for its authority to promulgate the
AWPPA, Canada has again asserted that Arctic ice is more
ciples of international law, shall be exercised by all States with reasonable
regard to the interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the
high seas."
52. AWPPA § 6(1).
53. Id. § 3(2).
54. Id. § 3(1). An exception is made where the line of equidistance
between Canada and Greenland is less than 100 miles.
55. Id. § 2(h): "'[W]aste' means
"(i) any substance that, if added to any waters would degrade or alter
or form part of a process of degradation or alteration of the quality of those
waters to an extent that is detrimental to their use by man or by an animal,
fish or plant that is useful to man, and
"(ii) any water that contains a substance in such a quantity or con-
centration, or that has been so treated, processed or changed, by heat or
other means, from a natural state that would, if added to any waters, degrade
or alter or form part of a process of degradation or alteration of the quality
of those waters to an extent that is detrimental to their use by man or by
an animal, fish or plant that is useful to man .
56. Id. § 5.
57. Id. §§ 11-12.
58. Id. § 12(1)(c).
59. Id. § 15.
60. Id. § 23.
61. Id. § 8.
62. Id. § 6.
63. Id. § 7(1).
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properly assimilated to land than to sea.6 4 However, any claim
to justify the anti-pollution legislation on this basis suffers from
the logical contradiction that the AWPPA attempts to regulate
shipping traffic.65 Opponents of the AWPPA further argue that
it is contrary to international law as evidenced by the Geneva
Convention on the High Seas66 which generally provides for the
maintenance of freedom of the seas.67
It is further argued that the Geneva Convention on the Ter-
ritorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone 8 codified international law
with respect to contiguous zones and limited their breadth to
twelve miles seaward from the baseline.69 Although Canada is
not party to the latter treaty, it is contended that it is neverthe-
less bound because the conventions codified customary interna-
tional law.70 The Canadian response to this position is that the
Geneva conventions did not produce a peremptory norm of
international law limiting the contiguous zone to a twelve-mile
breadth, but rather showed general acceptance by the world
community of the concept of contiguous zones, and "[i]t may
therefore be argued that a pollution zone is no less acceptable
because of spatially less modest limits if these limits are wholly
appropriate to the problems of pollution and the function of
environment control."7'
64. See note 14 supra.
65. Note, 3 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 192, 194 (1970).
66. Convention on the High Seas, done April 29, 1958, [1962] 2 U.S.T. 2312;
T.I.A.S. No. 5200; 450 U.N.T.S. 82 (effective 30 September 1962).
67. Id. art. 2.
68. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, done
April 29, 1958, [1964] 2 U.S.T. 1606; T.I.A.S. No. 5639; 516 U.N.T.S. 205 (effec-
tive 10 September 1964).
69. Id. art. 24(2).
70. See Bilder, supra note 46, at 13-14; Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, art. 43.
71. Johnston, supra note 14, at 316. see also Canadian Reply, supra note
15, at 607. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, done
April 29, 1958, art. 24(2) [1964] 2 U.S.T. 1606; T.I.A.S. No. 5639; 516 U.N.T.S.
205 (effective 10 September 1964) provides that "[tihe contiguous zone may
not extend beyond twelve miles from the baseline from which the breadth
of the territorial sea is measured." However, this limitation seems inapplicable
to anti-pollution zones since there is general recognition that a twelve-mile
breadth is insufficient for anti-pollution purposes (see note 48 supra). Further-
more, the twelve-mile limitation is outmoded since the United States has
now announced its willingness to accede to the demand for a uniform inter-
national breadth for territorial seas of twelve miles. See Stevenson, Inter-
national Law and the Oceans, 62 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 339, 341 (1970). Thus,
if there Is general acceptance of a twelve-mile territorial sea, a contiguous
zone must necessarily be broader than twelve miles as measured from the
baseline.
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Furthermore, Canadians maintain that the creation of an
extended contiguous zone for limited purposes is not necessarily
tantamount to an expansion of a nation's territorial sea, par-
ticularly where the national concern for the particular objectives
is genuine and valid:
"Recognition by the general community of particular
contiguous zones for particular purposes is not ... an invi-
tation to states to create comprehensive zones for all pur-
poses. Maximization of values is not necessarily promoted
by meaningless assertions of authority and, in fact, both
community sanction and self-interest may be counted upon
to preclude empty gestures. 7 2
Fears that the AWPPA would be cited by other nations for
justifying their own specious assertions of jurisdiction have fig-
ured prominently in the criticisms leveled at the Act by the
United States:
"If Canada had the right to claim and exercise exclusive
pollution and resources jurisdiction on the high seas, other
countries could assert the right to exercise jurisdiction for
other purposes, some reasonable and some not, but all equally
invalid according to international law. 73
It appears, however, that since one way in which international
law is created is through the practice of individual states, the
substantive norms of international law are being confused with
the methods by which international law may be created. Uni-
lateral acts are not invalid per se but may, on the contrary,
presage the general practice of states and become part of the
corpus of customary international law.74 Canada has been quick
to point out that the United States has in the past taken uni-
lateral measures, most notably, the "Truman Proclamation" of
1945.7 5 It is noteworthy that, in contrast to the caustic United
72. M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS 218 (1962).
73. 62 DEP'T STATE BULL. 610, 611 (1970), reproduced in 9 INT'L LEGAL MA-
TERIALS 605 (1970). But see Johnston, supra note 14, at 314.
74. See, e.g., 1 G. SCHWARZENBERGER, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 27
(4th ed. 1960); J. STARKE, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 35 (6th ed.
1967).
75. Presidential Proclamation No. 2667, 3 C.F.R. 67 (1943-48 Comp.), in
which President Truman proclaimed limited "jurisdiction and control" over
the continental shelf contiguous to the coast of the United States. The
success of that initiative has since given the United States cause to ponder
the wisdom of its chosen method:
"Perhaps if the United States had not itself uncorked the bottle and
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States' reaction, some nations adopted a more placid response
to the AWPPA: Responses ranged from unconditional acquies-
cence, through approval of the purpose, if not the method of
adoption, to rejection.70 The necessity for unilateral measures
has been recognized elsewhere, notably in the 1958 Geneva Con-
vention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources
of the High Seas.77 Furthermore, the argument has been made
that since the Convention on the High Seas did not expressly
forbid unilateral efforts but did recognize an obligation by states
to prevent pollution,78 no taint of illegality automatically at-
taches to such efforts by a single nation.79 Finally the detractors
of the AWPPA should be aware that:
"[lt is difficult to achieve much by relying on what is
recognized or perceived as a common interest. Protective
measures are often taken by states. These measures are in-
deed lawful under traditional customary international law.
But they are only taken where the danger is clear and local-
ized."80
Support for the AWPPA is also found in the "doctrine of
self-help, now to be interpreted as entitling a coastal state to
take reasonable precautions when faced with serious pollution
let loose the genie with its 1945 Truman Proclamation, the maritime powers
would have held off the rebellion a little bit longer-but when the United
States, defender of the 3-mile limit and champion of the freedom of the
seas, chose to act unilaterally it gave a license-not in a legal sense but in
a power-politics sense-to every other nation to make claims of its own if it
could make them stick. We tried to have it both ways and we failed." State-
ment by Leigh Ratiner, U.S. Dep't of Defense, reproduced in THE UNITED
NATIONS AND OCEAN MANAGEMENT, supra note 14, at 338.
76. Because one can expect states to acquiesce in unilateral measures
of other states which tend to cast past or anticipated measures of the non-
claimant state in a more favorable light, reactions of states to new legisla-
tion are often more apt to reflect their desire to have their own measures
accepted rather than an acknowledgment that the claimant state's legislation
is obligatory under international law.
77. Bee Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Re-
sources of the High Seas, done April 28, 1958, arts. 7, 8, 13 [1966] 1 U.S.T.
138; T.I.A.S. No. 5969; 559 U.N.T.S. 285 (effective 20 March 1966). It should
be noted that all such unilateral actions may, at the option of an aggrieved
party, be made the subject of mandatory arbitration. See generaily Koers,
supra note 14, at 6.
78. Convention on the High Seas, done April 29, 1958, arts. 24-25 [1962]
2 U.S.T. 2312; T.I.A.S. No. 5200; 450 U.N.T.S. 82 (effective 30 September 1962).
79. Koers, supra note 14, at 5.
80. Address by Oscar Schacter, Pres., American Society of Int'l Law, re-
produced in POLLUTION PROCEEDINGs, "upra note 42, at 60.
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dangers.""" This doctrine was recognized in the Caroline82 and
the prerequisites for invocation of the doctrine have been de-
scribed as a "necessity which is instant, overwhelming, and leav-
ing no choice for means and no moment for deliberation."' 3 In
order that the right of self-help will not be abused, the fol-
lowing "rule of proportionality," has been recommended:
"[A] rule of reasonableness, applicable both to an exces-
sively pre-emptive exercise of the freedom of the high seas
by a ship engaged in polluting the ocean and the excessive
remedial or abatement measures of a coastal state. 84
On this basis alone, some have held the AWPPA as unobjection-
able, 5 adding that the reasonableness of the self-defense actions
must be viewed in light of presently poor technological capa-
bilities to minimize the effects of pollution. 6
Still others have suggested the applicability of the justifi-
cation of "historic right."87 On the basis of the Anglo-Norwegian
Fisheries case88 Canada need not be restricted by present stan-
dards of international law if it could show a well-defined claim,
consistently applied, and a lack of opposition in the past by other
states.89
Value Reorientation in the Oceanic Regime
Appreciation of the problem of marine pollution has
prompted some to call for an international solution, in which
regional organizations and an "international environmental au-
thority," a new specialized agency, would be created and ad-
81. Johnston, supra note 14, at 335; LeGault, THE UNrTED NATIONS AND
OCEAN MANAGEMENT, supra note 14, at 297-98.
82. See 2 J. MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 217 (1906). The
Caroline was an American steamer destroyed in American territory by a
British raiding party during the 1837 Canadian insurrection. In the subse-
quent diplomatic exchange, the British Government sought to justify the
act as a permissible exercise of the right of "self-defense." Secretary of
State Webster agreed that such a right did exist in international law but
a British apology was accepted by the United States before the two nations
resolved their controversy over whether The Caroline affair actually was a
Justifiable act of self-defense.
83. Statement of Secretary of State Webster, reproduced id. at 412.
84. Goldie, Principles of Responsibility in Internat4onal Law, POLLUTION
PROCEEDINGS, supra note 42, at 31.
85. Id. at 25.
86. Johnston, supra note 14, at 314.
87. Note, 3 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 189, 196 (1970).
88. [1951] I.C.J. 116.
89. Note, 8 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 189, 196 (1970). Contra, Pharand, supra note
50, at 55-66.
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ministered under the auspices of the United Nations and charged
with the duty of curbing marine and fluvial pollution.90 Yet it
is unlikely that such an agency could be organized, or, if orga-
nized, allowed any real power until the international community
agrees to the need for a fundamental re-evaluation of the rela-
tive benefits of the specific uses of the oceans. Based on no longer
valid assumptions concerning the inexhaustibility of the sea's
resources, the present oceanic regime emphasizes maximum use
and minimum interference with the various usesY1 What must
be done is to reorder the present scheme of ocean use valuation
in order that conflicts between the various uses may be mini-
mized, and maximum benefits may be derived from exploitation
of the sea's resources.
Until a maritime regime is created which will accommodate
all contemporary interests in the use of the seas, the interna-
tional community must expect a continuation, if not an acceler-
ation, in the quantity of unilateral assertions of control over
the oceans. Some of these claims will probably be unwarranted,
but others will undoubtedly reflect the reasonable desires of
coastal states to protect valid national and international in-
terests. Under the present system, the legality of such acts often
cannot be pronounced with any degree of certainty until years
after promulgation, since the post hoc justification process gen-
erally requires extensive time to sort out the reactions of other
nations in order to determine whether the act has developed
into customary international law.9 2 For example, whereas Lau-
terpacht was able to conclude within five years after the Truman
Proclamation that the continental shelf doctrine had become a
part of customary international law, 93 other commentators re-
fused to accept this position as late as 1956 .4 Still others ac-
knowledged that the doctrine had achieved the status of law
90. Baxter, International Cooperation to Curb Fluvial and Maritime Pol-
lution, POLLUTION PROCEEDINGS, supra note 42, at 73.
91. Falk, Inability of Traditional Forms of Political Order to Adapt to
Modern Problems of International Pollution, POLLUTION PROCEEDINGS, supra
note 42, at 12. See also ALEXANDER, supra note 43, at 82.
92. "Wherever and as soon as a line of international conduct frequently
adopted by States is considered legally obligatory or legally right, the rule
which may be abstracted from such conduct is a rule of customary Inter-
national Law." 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw 27 (8th ed. H. Lauter-
pacht 1955).
93. Lauterpacht, Sovereignty Over Submarine Areas, 27 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L.
376-77 (1950).
94. Kunz, Continental Shelf and International Law: Confusion and Abuse,
50 AM. J. INT'L L. 828 (1956).
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but professed ignorance as to exactly when the doctrine achieved
its legitimacy.""
From the foregoing it would appear that there is a need to
formulate criteria with which to judge jurisdictional claims
asserted by a single state contemporaneously with their pro-
mulgation. Indeed, several potential criteria can be discerned
from the continuing debate over the AWPPA.
Initially, it would appear that the scope of the powers
claimed must be determined. Obviously, states which increase
the breadth of the territorial sea claim qualitatively greater
authority than those which assert a more limited jurisdiction.
However, the scope of the asserted powers must be viewed in
light of the breadth of the physical area over which power is
proclaimed. For example, an extension of a state's territorial
sea from three to twelve miles would probably meet little re-
sistance today considering the large number of states presently
claiming the wider margin.96 Conversely, assertions even of
limited jurisdiction become increasingly suspect as the breadth
of the zone increases.
Neither the scope of power nor the physical bounds are
absolute in application, but rather must be related to the pur-
pose for which the powers are claimed-a functional test.97
Thus, the creation of a contiguous zone twelve miles in breadth
to prevent pollution of adjacent waters would likely be a futile
gesture since major damage could easily arise from a mishap
occurring well beyond the twelve-mile boundary. It is apparent
that the three criteria so far suggested-scope of powers claimed,
area of asserted authority, and the purpose of the disputed mea-
sure-are functionally interrelated. Applying these standards
to the provisions of the AWPPA, it would appear that the Cana-
dian legislation fares moderately well. Even granting that the
Canadian Government has conferred upon itself rather great
powers over a large area, the nature of the problem dictates
the sweep of the claim.
At this point it should be clear that the standards thus far
discussed focus on defining the interests of the individual lit-
95. C. FRANKLIN, THE LAW OF THE SEA: SOME RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 62
(1961).
96. See Stevenson, supra note 76.
97. Johnston, mpra note 14, at 316.
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toral state. Obviously self-serving assertions may be pronounced
invalid without hesitation, but that which justifies a 100-mile
pollution prevention zone would just as handily justify a 200-
mile fisheries conservation zone. Thus, criteria must also be
posed which protect the international interests in the oceanic
regime.
One readily apparent test is whether or not the claim is
"acquisitive" or "regulatory" in effect."9 The AWPPA, for
example, does not permit Canada to assert title to the living
resources of Arctic waters-rather it provides for the protection
of interests which, while subjects of keen interest to Canada
as the adjacent coastal state, are also valuable to all nations.
Such interests include assurance of normal temperature vari-
ations and the preservation of migratory bird species. In con-
trast to the AWPPA would be legislation actually nationalizing
resources as well as that advertised as "regulatory" or conser-
vation-oriented, but which in effect would be "quasi-acquisitive"
-e.g., providing for preferential rights of exploitation by the
claimant state.
A maritime phenomenon popularly known as "creeping juris-
diction" (or "Craven's Law") has become the subject of par-
ticular contemporary concern.9 9 Basically, the theory of "creep-
ing jurisdiction" is that nations seek to acquire more extensive
rights on the basis of their past assertions of limited jurisdiction.
While it would appear that the "acquisitiveness" test would
reduce the probability of such cumulative assertions by the same
state, yet another method yielding the same result would be
insistence by the international community that the claimant
state specify with the greatest possible particularity the pur-
poses for which jurisdiction is asserted. Furthermore, and per-
haps more importantly, the assertions should be limited in time
to what is minimally necessary to accomplish the desired result.
Thus it has been suggested that while a protective zone of con-
trol must be erected around a producing oceanic oil field, the
98. Johnston, supra note 14, at 328, points out that the AWPPA does
not represent an "economic gain" for Canada.
99. See generally Craven, supra note 28; McDougal, Revision of the
Geneva Convention on the Law of the Sea-The Views of a Commentator,
1 NATURAL RESOURCES LAW. (No. 3) 19, 26 (1968); Schaefer, Freedom of Scien-
tifc Research and Exploration in the Sea, 4 STAN. J. INT'L STUDIES 46 (1969).
See also comments on the phenomenon in the discussion in THE UNITED
NATIONS AND OCEAN MANAGEMENT, supra note 14, at 328.
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zone should be abandoned for all purposes when the field ceases
to produce. In short, claims must be judged in part on the
basis of temporality.100
Finally, states should be permitted some leeway if "special
circumstances" exist. For example the relatively more destruc-
tive effects of an oil spill in the Arctic as compared to a less
frigid region should be weighed in an evaluation of the AWPPA.
One could also find less fault with a nondiscriminatory statute
than with one which singles out certain nations for application.
The criteria proposed above are not intended to be determi-
native in a mathematical sense of the validity of unilateral acts,
but rather are suggested as general analytical guidelines. Appli-
cation of the proposed tests to the AWPPA could not result in
a definitive verdict of validity or invalidity; nevertheless, the
application by individual states of criteria such as those sug-
gested above could easily result in the generation of an inter-
national consensus to the effect that the AWPPA is inoffensive
and therefore acceptable.
The adoption of standards for passing upon unilateral asser-
tions of jurisdiction could thus bring about a reduction in the
length of time now necessary to pronounce the validity of such
assertions. Even more effective would be the inclusion of judi-
cially manageable criteria in a draft convention adopted by the
upcoming 1973 United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea.
Burt K. Carnahan
100. Bee Craven, supra note 28, at 533; Henkin, eupra note 33, at 135,
recommends that all such innovations be announced as temporary measures
pending international agreement. This fails to relate temporality to func-
tional necessity and also makes no allowance for a justifiable assertion of
limited jurisdiction, parts or all of which may be non-negotiable.
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